How Much Consumption Insurance Beyond Self-Insurance? by Greg Kaplan & Giovanni L. Violante
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We thank Richard Blundell, Eric French, and Luigi Pistaferri. Violante is grateful to the National Science
Foundation (grant SES-0418029) for financial support. The views expressed here are those of the authors
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.
Previous versions of the paper circulated with the title “How Much Insurance in Bewley Models?”
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Greg Kaplan and Giovanni L. Violante. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.How Much Consumption Insurance Beyond Self-Insurance?
Greg Kaplan and Giovanni L. Violante




We assess the degree of consumption smoothing implicit in a calibrated life-cycle version of the standard
incomplete-markets model, and we compare it to the empirical estimates of Blundell et al. (2008) (BPP
hereafter). We find that households in the model have access to less consumption-smoothing against
permanent earnings shocks than what is measured in the data. BPP estimate that 36% of permanent
shocks are insurable (i.e., do not translate into consumption growth), whereas the model’s counterpart
of the BPP estimator varies between 7% and 22%, depending on the tightness of debt limits. In the
model, the age profile of the insurance coefficient is sharply increasing, whereas BPP find no clear
age slope in their estimate. Allowing for a plausible degree of “advance information” about future
earnings does not reconcile the model-data gap. If earnings shocks display mean reversion, even with
very high autocorrelation, then the average degree of consumption smoothing in the model agrees
with the BPP empirical estimate, but its age profile remains steep. Finally, we show that the BPP estimator
of the true insurance coefficient has, in general, a downward bias that grows as borrowing limits become
tighter.
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Macroeconomists need reliable empirical estimates of the extent to which household con-
sumption is insulated from income ﬂuctuations, for at least two reasons. First, imperfect
risk sharing is at the heart of heterogeneous-agents, incomplete-markets models. Thus, the
availability of a simple empirical measure of consumption insurance would allow researchers
to compare, parsimoniously, the predictions of diﬀerent incomplete-markets models along
their most salient dimension. Second, macroeconomic models are routinely used for policy
evaluation and design. For example, a reform from a progressive to a ﬂat tax system is
judged on the basis of the gains from reduced distortions and the losses from lower redistri-
bution. But the size of the latter margin depends on how much smoothing agents can do on
their own, through private risk-sharing. Getting this magnitude right in the model is a key
requisite if the model is to deliver reliable predictions for policy experiments.
Today, the measurement of consumption insurance against earnings shocks acquires par-
ticular salience in the US economy because of the recent sharp increase in cross-sectional
wage dispersion. Understanding the macroeconomic and welfare implications of this dra-
matic change in the wage structure requires models with the correct degree of risk-sharing.1
The empirical assessment of the transmission of income shocks into consumption is un-
dermined by two diﬃculties. First, one needs both longitudinal data on income and on a
comprehensive measure of consumption. In the US such a data set is not available. As
a result, authors have either opted for using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data alone (Hall & Mishkin 1982, Altonji & Siow 1987,
Cochrane 1991, Mace 1991, Dynarski & Gruber 1997), or opted for constructing synthetic
cohorts to merge high-quality cross-sectional income and consumption data (Attanasio &
Davis 1996). Second, one needs to identify individual income shocks in the data. From the
shape of the empirical autocovariance function of individual income, it is well known that
income changes are best described by a combination of highly persistent and highly transi-
tory shocks (MaCurdy 1982, Abowd & Card 1989, Blundell & Preston 1998). However, in
panel data one observes only the total income change and cannot disentangle the realization
of the shocks of diﬀerent persistence. As a consequence, some authors have chosen to simply
measure the response of consumption to total income changes (Altonji & Siow 1987, Krueger
1Krueger & Perri (2006), Heathcote et al. (2008b), and Guvenen & Kuruscu (2008) oﬀer alternative views
in this debate.
1& Perri 2005, 2008), whereas others have used proxies for permanent and transitory income
changes (e.g., disability and short unemployment spells, respectively) in an attempt to sep-
arately identify the two shocks (Cochrane 1991, Dynarski & Gruber 1997). Finally, a large
literature tries to estimate the consumption response of households to tax rebates (Souleles
1999, Shapiro & Slemrod 2003). Often unclear is whether such tax rebates are perceived as a
permanent or transitory change in income by households. Moreover, consumers’ response to
the rebate depends on whether they expect a simultaneous change in government purchases.
In a recent paper, Blundell et al. (2008) (BPP, hereafter) make some important progress
in overcoming these two diﬃculties. First, the authors construct a new panel data set for the
United States with household information on income and nondurable consumption.2 Next,
they use this data set to estimate consumption insurance coeﬃcients for permanent and
transitory idiosyncratic income shocks, i.e., the fraction of the shocks that does not translate
into movements in consumption. We return to the details of their methodology later. They
ﬁnd that 36% of permanent shocks and 95% of transitory shocks to disposable (i.e., post taxes
and transfers) labor income are insurable. These ﬁndings are qualitatively consistent with
a large literature that rejects full insurance in the US economy (Cochrane 1991, Attanasio
& Davis 1996, Fisher & Johnson 2006), and with the “excess smoothness” ﬁnding (i.e.,
consumption reacts to permanent shocks less than what is predicted by the permanent
income hypothesis) in the context of aggregate and individual consumption (Campbell &
Deaton 1989, Attanasio & Pavoni 2007).
In light of the previous discussion, we argue that the BPP insurance coeﬃcients should be-
come central in quantitative macroeconomics. They provide a yardstick to measure whether
current incomplete-markets macroeconomic frameworks used for quantitative analysis admit
the right amount of household insurance. In this paper, we begin this investigation within
what is, arguably, the standard incomplete markets (SIM) model, a world where house-
holds have no access to state-contingent claims but can self-insure by trading a non-state-
contingent bond. In the last decade, this model has become the leading tool for quantitative
2The key step is, following Skinner (1987), the imputation of a measure for nondurable consumption for
each individual/year observation in the PSID by exploiting the fact that food consumption is available in
both the PSID and the CEX. From the CEX, one can estimate a relationship between food and nondurable
consumption expenditures—a food demand function—and then invert the demand function and implement
the imputation procedure at the household level, based on the reported value for food consumption in the
PSID records. In Fisher and Johnson (2006), a recent implementation of this strategy is applied to the study
of consumption mobility.
2analysis in macroeconomics.3 We choose a life-cycle version of the model with capital in
positive net supply where households have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility,
are subject to permanent and transitory shocks to earnings whereas they work, and during
retirement receive social security beneﬁts through a scheme that closely mimics the US sys-
tem. Households smooth shocks by borrowing, as long as their accumulated debt is below
a pre-speciﬁed limit. We consider two extreme cases: a natural borrowing limit and a zero
borrowing limit. They also save for life-cycle and precautionary reasons, and their wealth
helps to absorb income shocks. The calibration of the model uses standard parameter values
in this literature.
By simulating an artiﬁcial panel from the model, we address two questions: (i) How
does the BPP empirical estimate for consumption smoothing compare to its SIM model
counterpart? Put diﬀerently, how much consumption insurance is there in the data, over and
beyond self-insurance? (ii) Does the BPP methodology yield reliable estimates of insurance
coeﬃcients? Answering this last question is possible because in the model we can compute
both the true insurance coeﬃcient and the value for the BPP estimator.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, the model counterpart of the BPP
insurance coeﬃcient for transitory shocks is 94% in the natural borrowing constraint (NBC)
economy and 82% in the zero borrowing constraint (ZBC) economy, and hence close to
the empirical estimate of 95%. The insurance coeﬃcient for permanent shocks is 22% in
the NBC economy and only 7% in the ZBC economy. In both cases the model contains
less insurance with respect to permanent shocks relative to the BPP empirical estimate of
36%, even though this point estimate is quite imprecise. Moreover, the life-cycle pattern of
insurance coeﬃcients for permanent shocks is sharply increasing and convex, whereas BPP
ﬁnd no evidence of a clear age proﬁle. This discrepancy suggests that the model generates too
much consumption smoothing for older workers nearing retirement, but too little smoothing
for workers in the early stages of their life cycle.
Second, we assess the reliability of the estimator proposed by BPP to identify insurance
for each type of shock. We ﬁnd that the estimator works very well for transitory shocks, but
it tends to systematically underestimate the true coeﬃcient for permanent shocks, which are
23% in both the NBC and the ZBC economies. The reason is that the estimation procedure,
analogous to an instrumental variables approach, exploits an orthogonality condition between
3See Heathcote, Storesletten & Violante (2009) for a recent survey of this literature.
3consumption growth and a particular linear combination of past and future income shocks.
The bias results from the fact that this orthogonality condition holds only approximately
in the model. When borrowing constraints are loose the bias is negligible, but when they
are tight this failure becomes severe. If we correct for this bias, the empirical insurance
coeﬃcients could be even larger than those estimated.
In light of these two ﬁndings, we explore two alternative ways in which SIM models could
generate less sensitivity of consumption to permanent shocks. We ﬁrst allow agents to have
some foresight about future income realizations. We model this advance information in two
ways. When we let agents know a fraction of the permanent shock one period ahead of time
(short-run foreknowledge), we show that the BPP estimator of insurance coeﬃcients is, in
essence, invariant to the amount of advanced information. When we assume that earnings
have an individual-speciﬁc deterministic trend that is known by the agent from “birth”
(long-run foreknowledge), then the BPP estimator reﬂects a mix of insurance and foresight,
and increases with the amount of advance information. However, we argue that for plausibly
calibrated heterogeneity in income proﬁles, the estimated coeﬃcients remain lower than in
the data. Overall, advance information does not bridge the gap between model and data.
Next, we generalize the statistical process for earnings. Instead of restricting it to an I(1)
as assumed by BPP, we posit that the persistent component of the income process is AR(1).
We ﬁrst show that the BPP method performs quite well, even under this misspeciﬁcation
error, for high degrees of persistence (ρ). Next, we document that for ρ between 0.93 and
0.97, depending on the tightness of the constraint, the insurance coeﬃcient for persistent
shocks in the model can, on average, achieve its empirical value. However, its life-cycle
proﬁle remains quite steep. We discuss some modiﬁcations of the model that either (i) shift
wealth holdings from the old to the young, allowing the former to self-insure more eﬀectively,
or (ii) introduce explicit insurance against labor market shocks for younger agents.
Finally, we contrast the concept of insurance coeﬃcient as a measure of risk sharing, with
another norm for risk sharing proposed by Deaton & Paxson (1994) and Storesletten et al.
(2004) and used extensively used in the literature: the steepness of life cycle consumption
dispersion. There is no contradiction between our result that the model stops short of
replicating the empirical insurance coeﬃcient and their ﬁnding that it generates the right
increase in consumption inequality over the life cycle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a general framework for
4measuring insurance and describes the BPP methodology as a special case. Section 3 outlines
the version of the SIM model we use for our experiments and describes its parametrization.
Section 4 contains the results from our benchmark economies and from a series of sensitivity
analysis. Section 5 introduces advance information into the model. Section 6 analyzes the
robustness of our ﬁndings to the degree of persistence of income shocks. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 A framework for measuring insurance
2.1 Insurance coeﬃcients
Income process Suppose that residual (i.e., deviations from a deterministic and pre-
dictable experience proﬁle common across all households) log-earnings yit for household i of







where xi,t−j is an (m × 1) vector of shocks with generic element xit, and aj is an (m × 1)
vector of coeﬃcients. The shocks are i.i.d. in the population and over time. Let σ =
(σ1,...,σm)
′ be the corresponding vector of variances for these shocks. This formulation is
extremely general and incorporates, for example, linear combinations of ARIMA processes
with ﬁxed eﬀects.
Insurance coeﬃcients Let cit be log consumption for household i at age t. We deﬁne
the insurance coeﬃcient for shock xit as
φ




where the variance and covariance are taken cross-sectionally over the entire population of
households. One can similarly deﬁne the insurance coeﬃcient at age t (denoted by φ
x
t), where
variance and covariance are taken conditionally on all households of age t. The insurance
coeﬃcient in (2) has an intuitive interpretation: it is the share of the variance of the x shock
that does not translate into consumption growth.
Identiﬁcation and estimation In any given model, it is straightforward to calculate
(2) by simulation, since the shocks are observable in the model. However, identifying and
5estimating (2) from the data poses a crucial diﬃculty: the individual shocks are not directly
observed and cannot be identiﬁed from a ﬁnite panel of income data.4
Suppose panel data on households’ income and consumption are available. Let yi be
the vector of income realizations for individual i at all ages t = 0,...,T, and let gx
t (yi)
index measurable functions of this income history, one for each t and for each shock x.






cov (∆cit,xit) = cov(∆cit,g
x
t (yi)),
and then constructing φ
x as
φ






Verifying the ﬁrst condition in (3) only requires knowledge of the true income process, but
verifying the second condition also requires knowledge of how the empirical consumption
allocation depends on the entire income vector (past and future realizations of the shocks).
Thus, it requires knowing the true data-generating process (i.e., the model) for consumption.
This approach is best thought of in terms of instrumental variables regressions. If gx
t (yi)
satisﬁes the conditions in (3), then the resulting expression for 1−φ
x is equivalent to the coef-
ﬁcient from an instrumental variables regression of consumption changes on income changes,
using gx
t (yi) as an instrument. In general, the correct choice of instrument depends on the
particular speciﬁcation of the income process, and the underlying true model for consump-
tion. To progress further, one has to make assumptions about both.
2.2 BPP methodology
One can view the BPP methodology precisely as a choice of a particular income process and
consumption allocation.
BPP income process BPP choose the sum of a random walk (permanent) and a
MA(1) component as their income process. In what follows, to avoid keeping track of an
4Note that it is not suﬃcient to identify the variances of the diﬀerent shocks, i.e., the vector σ. Rather,
the realizations of the shocks must be identiﬁed, household by household. With a very long sequence of
observations, realizations may be identiﬁed using ﬁltering techniques. However the pervasive heterogeneity
and the short time dimension of commonly available panel data sets are likely to make ﬁltering techniques
unreliable in this context.
6extra state variable in the model’s computation, we simplify the latter component to an
i.i.d. shock.5 This choice corresponds to setting m = 2, xit = (ηit,εit)
′, a0 = (1,1)
′, and
aj = (1,0)
′ for j ≥ 1 in (1), which yields
yit = zit + εit, (5)
where zit follows a unit root process with shock ηit, and εit is an i.i.d. income shock with
variances ση and σε, respectively.6 It follows that income growth can be written as
∆yit = ηit + ∆εit. (6)
This is a very common income process in the empirical labor literature, at least since
MaCurdy (1982), and Abowd & Card (1989), who showed that this speciﬁcation is parsimo-
nious and yet ﬁts income data well. In Section 6, we verify the robustness of our results to
more general speciﬁcations of the income process.
BPP consumption model BPP assume that the following pair of orthogonality con-










= cov(∆cit,εi,t−2) = 0. (SM)
The ﬁrst assumption means that the agent has “No Foresight” (or no advanced information)
about future shocks. The second assumption translates into “Short Memory” (or short
history dependence) of the consumption allocation with respect to shocks.7
5This simpliﬁcation means that our transitory component is slightly more short-lived compared to the
BPP component. One should keep this in mind when comparing the insurance coeﬃcients for transitory
shocks obtained by simulating the model with the BPP counterpart. We conjecture this eﬀect is quantita-
tively minor. Moreover, it has no bearing on the analysis of permanent shocks, which is the main focus of
our study.
6BPP allow the variances of the shocks to be time-varying in their estimation. Once again, we chose an
income process with constant variances of the shocks to keep the computation of the model manageable.
In Section 4 we show that our results are robust to plausible changes in the magnitude of permanent and
transitory volatility, so this simpliﬁcation is innocuous.








it are the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent and transitory shocks, and ξit
is a residual component. The choice of this speciﬁcation is motivated by the fact that, according to BPP,
it approximates well the solution of a life cycle optimization problem where agents have CRRA utility. The
assumption implicit in the BPP study is that (π
η
it,πε
it,ξit) are all independent of income innovations at every
relevant lead and lag.
7Under these assumptions, BPP propose a strategy to identify and estimate the insurance
coeﬃcients. For the transitory shock ε, they set gε
t (yi)=∆yi,t+1 and note that
cov (∆yit,∆yi,t+1) = −var (εit), (7)
cov(∆cit,∆yi,t+1) = −cov (∆cit,εit),
whereas for the permanent shocks η, they set g
η
t (yi)=∆yi,t−1+∆yit +∆yi,t+1 and note that
cov (∆yit,∆yi,t−1 + ∆yit + ∆yi,t+1) = var(ηit), (8)
cov(∆cit,∆yi,t−1 + ∆yit + ∆yi,t+1) = cov(∆cit,ηit).
Combining (4) with (7) and (8) conﬁrms that these instruments do in fact correctly
identify the insurance coeﬃcients (φ
η,φ
ε). It is easy to verify that only the orthogonality
condition in (NF) is required for the identiﬁcation of the insurance coeﬃcients for transitory
shocks, whereas both (NF) and (SM) are needed for permanent shocks.
In what follows, we call φ
x
BPP the insurance coeﬃcient estimator based on the BPP
methodology. When the orthogonality conditions hold, φ
x
BPP = φ
x, but when they do not
there will be a bias in φ
x
BPP.8
Generality of the BPP approach The obvious question, at this point, is: how
general are assumptions (NF) and (SM)? In the absence of advance information about
future earnings realizations, (NF) holds. But, in certain instances, it fails. An example
is in the presence of individual-speciﬁc predictable age-earnings proﬁles, a common class of
income processes in the empirical labor literature introduced by Lillard & Weiss (1979). We
return to this point in Section 5.
With respect to assumption (SM), one can verify whether it holds in general only in
models where the consumption allocation has a closed form. In the absence of a closed form,
as in the standard incomplete-markets economy that we study in this paper, one must rely
on model simulations.
The consumption literature oﬀers few closed-form solutions. It is easy to see that
complete-markets and autarkic economies satisfy (SM). Under complete markets, idiosyn-
cratic shocks do not aﬀect consumption, hence cov(∆cit,xit) = 0 and φ
x = 1. In autarky,
8In their estimation, BPP make use of the entire variance-covariance matrix of (∆cit,∆yit). However,
even with this more complex estimation procedure, identiﬁcation crucially hinges upon the (NF) and (SM)
assumptions stated earlier.
8∆cit = ∆yit, hence, cov(∆cit,xit) = var(xit) and φ
x = 0. Note that in these two extreme
cases, the value of φ
x is independent of the durability of the shock.
The strict version of the life-cycle, rational expectations, permanent income hypothesis
(PIH), where agents have quadratic utility, live for T periods, and can borrow and save at a
constant risk-free rate r equal to the discount rate, generates the following rule for changes
in consumption, when combined with the income process in (5) speciﬁed in levels:
∆Cit = ηit + χtεit,
where χt = r
(1+r)
1
1−(1+r)−(T−t+1).9 Hence, the PIH satisﬁes the BPP assumptions, and the
insurance coeﬃcients (deﬁned in terms of levels rather than logs) for a PIH economy are
φ
η
t = 0 and φ
ε
t = 1 − χt. These values imply full transmission of permanent shocks to
consumption and a smoothing coeﬃcient for transitory shocks that starts near one and
decreases monotonically towards zero as the end of life becomes nearer. In what follows, we
call this latter result the “horizon eﬀect.”10
Finally, one can verify that the BPP assumptions hold in the partial insurance economy
developed by Heathcote et al. (2007) and in the moral-hazard economy studied by Attanasio
& Pavoni (2007), both of which provide closed-form solutions.
These examples demonstrate that, in a wide variety of economic environments, it is
possible to justify consumption allocations that are consistent with (NF) and (SM) and the
BPP estimator is unbiased. But is this true also for standard incomplete-markets models?
We answer this question in detail in the next sections.
BPP ﬁndings Straightforward application of a minimum distance algorithm allows
estimation of the cross-sectional covariances in (7) and (8).11 BPP reach three main ﬁnd-
ings. First, when labor income is deﬁned as household earnings after tax and transfers, the
insurance coeﬃcient for permanent shocks φ
η
BPP is estimated to be 0.36 (s.e. 0.09). Sec-
ond, the insurance coeﬃcient for transitory shocks φ
ε
BPP is estimated to be 0.95 (s.e. 0.04).
9We use upper case letters to denote variables in levels and lower case letters to denote variables in logs.
10In the context of the PIH, this structural identiﬁcation approach based on closed forms has a long
history. Pioneering work by Sargent (1978), on aggregate data, and Hall & Mishkin (1982), on longitudinal
PSID data, exploits restrictions across income and consumption processes implied by the PIH to estimate
the model’s parameters. A more recent example is Blundell & Preston (1998).
11Note that the model can only be estimated from panel data with at least four consecutive observations
on both household income and consumption. None of the currently available U.S. surveys have this feature.
As discussed in the introduction, BPP cleverly merge the CEX and PSID and construct a long panel with
nondurable consumption and income observations. See BPP (2004, 2008) for details.
9Third, BPP ﬁnd no clear evidence of a signiﬁcant age proﬁle in the insurance coeﬃcients for
permanent shocks.12 In order to assess the robustness of this result, we split BPP’s sample
into two groups based on age, and repeated their empirical procedure. We found that for
the younger half of the sample (30-47 years) the insurance coeﬃcient is 0.43 (s.e. 0.12),
whereas for the older group (48-65 years) the insurance coeﬃcient is 0.19 (s.e. 0.19). The
large standard errors that arise from reducing the sample size by half mean that one cannot
reject a null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for the two groups are equal. We conclude that
there is no strong evidence to support a signiﬁcant age proﬁle in φ
η
BPP.
3 A model to interpret the BPP ﬁndings
In this section, we outline and calibrate a life-cycle SIM economy (Deaton 1991, Hubbard
et al. 1995, Imrohoroglu et al. 1995, Rios-Rull 1995, Huggett 1996, Carroll 1997). We then
simulate an artiﬁcial panel of household income and consumption from the model, and
calculate the model’s counterpart of the BPP insurance coeﬃcients. By comparing them
to the empirical values estimated by BPP we can learn whether the observed amount of
consumption insurance can be replicated in an environment where agents self-insure by
borrowing and saving through a risk-free asset.
Moreover, since in the model we can compute both the true insurance coeﬃcients and
those based on the BPP instruments, we are also in a position to assess the reliability of the
BPP methodology. We will ﬁnd out if and when assumptions (NF) and (SM) are violated.
3.1 The economy
There is no aggregate uncertainty. The economy is populated with a continuum of house-
holds, indexed by i. Agents work until age T ret, at which time they enter into retirement.
The unconditional probability of surviving to age t is denoted by ξt. We assume that ξt = 1
for the ﬁrst T ret − 1 periods, so that there is no chance of dying before retirement. After
retirement, ξt < 1 and all agents die by age T with certainty. Altruism is assumed away.
In order to focus solely on income uncertainty, we assume that there exist perfect annuity
markets so that households are completely insured against survival risk.
12They allow for a linear age trend in φ
η
BPP and estimate a small, positive slope that is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.






During the working years, households receive labor income Yit which comprises three com-
ponents in logs:
logYit = κt + yit
yit = zit + εit,
where κt is a deterministic experience proﬁle that is common across all households, and yit
is the stochastic portion of income; zit is a permanent component and εit is a transitory
component. The component zit follows a random walk
zit = zi,t−1 + ηit,
where zi0 is drawn from an initial Normal distribution with mean zero and variance σz0.
The shocks εit and ηit have mean zero, are Normally distributed with variances σε and ση,
are orthogonal to each other, and are independent over time and across households in the
economy. This is precisely the BPP income process.
The concept of labor income that we adopt in the model for Yit is households’ earnings
after taxes and transfers, the same used by BPP in the calculation of the insurance coef-
ﬁcients. However, it is useful to also deﬁne gross (or pre-government) labor income as ˜ Yit,
with ˜ Yit = G(Yit). For now, it suﬃces to think of the G function as the inverse of a tax
function. In the calibration section, we explain in detail how we obtain G.





ment, which are a function of the entire individual vector of gross earnings realizations
˜ Yi =
n
˜ Yi1,..., ˜ Yit,..., ˜ Yi,Tret−1
o
.
Households can trade a risk-free, one-period bond which pays a constant after-tax rate
of return, 1 + r. We denote by Ai,t+1 the amount of this asset carried over by individual i
from time t to t+1. As usual in these models, this asset has the twin role of a store of value
and of a vehicle of self-insurance. Households begin their life with initial wealth Ai0 drawn
from the distribution H (Ai0) and face a lower bound A≤ 0 on their asset position.
11The household’s budget constraint in this economy is, therefore,










, if t ≥ T ret
(9)
Finally, it is useful to note that in the version of the model with A= 0, households
behave close to the buﬀer-stock, no-debt consumers characterized by Carroll (1997)—the
only diﬀerence being the retirement period and the social security system.
For reasons we explain in the next section, in solving the model we do not impose re-
strictions that would correspond to a closed-economy general equilibrium of a production
economy. However, our allocations of the baseline economy can also be interpreted as equi-
librium outcomes.13
3.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model parameters to reproduce certain key features of the US economy.
Our parametrization is standard for this class of economies.
Demographics The model period is one year. Households enter the labor market at
age 25. We set T ret = 35 and T = 70. Thus workers retire at age 60 and die with certainty
at age 95. The survival rates ξt are obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics
(1992).
Preferences We choose a CRRA speciﬁcation for u(Cit) with risk aversion parameter
γ = 2. We explore the sensitivity of our results to values of γ in the range [1,15].
Discount factor and interest rate The size of the stock of accumulated assets
directly aﬀects the extent to which income shocks are smoothed. Hence it is important to
ensure that the wealth to income ratio in the model is similar to that in the US economy. We
set β to match an aggregate wealth-income ratio of 2.5. This is, approximately, the average
wealth to average income ratio computed from the 1989 and 1992 Survey of Consumers
Finances (SCF), when wealth is deﬁned as total net worth, income is pre-tax labor earnings
13In particular, any chosen value for the interest rate can be rationalized as the equilibrium marginal
product of capital with the appropriate value of the technology parameters (depreciation and capital share).
The government budget constraint can be thought of as holding exactly by assuming that the residual
between tax revenues and pension beneﬁts represents non-valued government consumption, and aggregate
initial transfers to newborn agents distributed based on the function H (Ai0).
12plus capital income, and the top 5% of households in the wealth distribution are excluded.14
The reason for this exclusion is comparability with the PSID and the CEX, the key sources of
the BPP estimates. It is well known that both the PSID and the CEX severely undersample
the top of the wealth distribution.15 We choose 1989 and 1992 as benchmark years for
consistency with the sample period used by BPP. We study the sensitivity of our ﬁnding to
the choice of the capital-income ratio target.
Since our benchmark model is calibrated to generate only half of the total wealth in the
US economy, we do not determine the interest rate in equilibrium. Instead, we set r = 3%
and report results for diﬀerent values of r in our robustness analysis.
Income process We calibrate the common deterministic age proﬁle for log income κt
using PSID data.16 For the stochastic components of the income process, three parameters
are required. These are the variance of the two shocks, σε and ση, and the cross-sectional
variance of the initial value of the permanent component σz0. In our benchmark calibration,
we set the variance of permanent shocks to be 0.01 to match the rise in earnings dispersion
over the life cycle in the PSID from age 25 to age 60. The initial variance of the permanent
shocks is set at 0.15 to match the dispersion of household earnings at age 25. We set the
variance of transitory shocks to be 0.05, at the BPP point estimate. We also report results
from various sensitivity analyses on these values.17
Initial wealth In the benchmark calibration, we assume that all households start
their economic life with zero wealth, i.e., Ai0 = 0. We also consider an environment in
which initial wealth levels are drawn from a distribution calibrated to replicate the empirical
distribution of wealth for young households in the data.18
14Later, we explain how, in the model, we translate after-tax income Yit into a measure of pre-tax, or
gross, income ˜ Yit that is needed to calibrate the wealth-income ratio and to determine social security beneﬁts
paid to each household.
15Wolﬀ (1999) (Table 6) documents that the PSID and the SCF agree upon the amount of wealth held by
the median household, and by the bottom four quintiles, but large discrepancies are found at the top. As
a result, in 1992 average wealth in the SCF is 50% higher than in the PSID, which is precisely the share of
net worth held by the top 5% in the SCF.
16The estimated proﬁle peaks after 21 years of labor market experience at roughly twice the initial value,
and then it slowly declines to about 80% of the peak value.
17In particular, we run a set of simulations with ση = 0.02, which is the BPP estimate for the variance
of the permanent component. Such value implies an excessive rise of earnings dispersion over the life cycle.
Nevertheless, it is the point estimate that is typically obtained when the permanent-transitory income process
is estimated using moments in ﬁrst-diﬀerences, as in BPP.
18Precisely, we target the empirical distribution of ﬁnancial wealth-earnings ratios in the population of
households aged 20-30 in the SCF. We assume that the initial draw of earnings is independent of the initial
13Borrowing limit We consider two alternative borrowing limits.19 We allow for bor-
rowing subject only to the restriction that with probability one, households who live up to
age T do not die in debt (i.e., the “natural debt limit”). This assumption represents an upper
bound on the amount agents can borrow.20 We also study the self-insurance possibilities of
agents when the other extreme of no borrowing, A= 0, is imposed.21
Social security beneﬁts Social security beneﬁts are a function of lifetime average





˜ Yit. This function is designed to mimic the
actual US system. This is achieved by specifying that beneﬁts are equal to 90% of average
past earnings up to a given bend point, 32% from this ﬁrst bend point to a second bend
point, and 15% beyond that. The two bend points are set at, respectively, 0.18 and 1.10 times
cross-sectional average gross earnings, based on the US legislation and individual earnings
data for 1990. Beneﬁts are then scaled proportionately so that a worker earning average
labor income each year is entitled to a replacement rate of 45% (Mitchell & Phillips 2006).
To compute social security beneﬁts for each household, we need to translate net earnings
Yit, our primitive earnings concept entering the working households’ budget constraint, into
gross earnings ˜ Yit. We do it by inverting the non-linear tax function estimated by Gouveia
& Strauss (1994) and used, for example, by Castaneda et al. (2003). The explicit functional


















The values for τb and τρ are taken from Gouveia & Strauss (1994) and set at τb = 0.258
and τρ = 0.768, their estimates for 1989, the latest year available.22 The value for τs is then
chosen so that the ratio of total personal current tax receipts on labor income (not including
social security contributions) to total labor income is the same as for the US economy in
draw of this ratio, since in the data the empirical correlation is 0.02.
19The model displays precautionary saving both because of prudence as deﬁned by Kimball (1990) and
because households save to avoid hitting the debt limit (Huggett 1993).
20The level of the natural debt limit depends on the discretization of the income process, through the level
of the lowest possible income realization. In the benchmark economy, the natural borrowing limit decreases
from approximately 5.8 times average annual earnings at age 25 to 2.5 times average earnings at age 50.
21In a typical simulation of our economy with A = 0, about 7% of households are at the constraint. These
are primarily very young households. The fraction constrained decreases from 44% at age 26 to almost zero
around age 45, but it rises again during retirement, since the optimal consumption path is downward sloping
(at rate βR) and the pension income path is constant.
22We exclude social security tax from the Gouveia-Strauss tax function because it is not subtracted from
the net earnings deﬁnition of BPP.
141990, i.e., roughly 25%. Given a realization for after-tax earnings Yit, we compute the





implicitly, determines the G function deﬁned earlier.
As in the US system, in the model the government taxes 85% of beneﬁts through the




in the retiree’s budget constraint (9) represents net beneﬁts.
4 Results
All our results are based on simulating, from the invariant distribution of the model economy,
an artiﬁcial panel of 50,000 households for 70 periods, a full life-cycle. We have veriﬁed that
increasing the sample size further does not lead to any change in the results.23 Our two
benchmark economies are calibrated as described in Section 3.2, and diﬀer only through the
borrowing constraint (and therefore the discount factor). The ﬁrst economy has the loosest
possible debt limit, the second has the tightest (zero). We refer to these two models as the
natural borrowing constraint (NBC), and the zero borrowing constraint (ZBC) economies.
4.1 Consumption and wealth over the life cycle
It is useful to begin with an examination of the life-cycle proﬁle of the ﬁrst two moments
(mean, variance of the log) for income, consumption, and wealth in the two baseline models.
The life cycle is plotted in Figure 1.
Average net earnings and social security beneﬁts are exogenously fed into the model.
Mean consumption grows until retirement because of the precautionary saving motive, which
explains why its proﬁle is steeper in the ZBC model. It then declines at a constant rate
during retirement since the precautionary motive is absent, annuity markets are perfect, and
the intertemporal saving motive is negative, i.e., βR < 1. Mean wealth dynamics follow
the typical triangle-shaped path of life-cycle models. In the NBC economy, households are
indebted, on average, for the ﬁrst decade, but then they decumulate wealth at a slower rate
once retired. The reason is that both economies have the same aggregate capital-income
23The model is solved using the method of endogenous grid points developed by Carroll (2006) with 100
exponentially spaced grid points for assets. The grid for lifetime average earnings has 19 points. The decision
rule is constrained to be linear between grid points. The permanent component is approximated using a
discrete Markov chain with 39 equally spaced points on an age-varying grid chosen to match the age-speciﬁc
unconditional variances. The transitory component is approximated with 19 equally spaced points. We have
veriﬁed that further increasing the cardinality of the grids does not aﬀect our conclusions.




















































Figure 1: Life-cycle proﬁles for means and variances in the NBC and ZBC economies.
ratio, and agents in the NBC economy optimally hold lower wealth than the ZBC agents
during their youth, and more during retirement.
The cross-sectional variance of log net earnings increases linearly over the life cycle be-
cause of the cumulation of permanent shocks and drops to a constant level during retirement,
since pension beneﬁts are deterministic and much less unequal than labor income.
Consumption inequality rises during the work life but more slowly than earnings inequal-
ity, thanks to the self-insurance and the redistributive social security system. The initial
level of consumption inequality is lower in the NBC economy, since, initially, borrowing
allows households to smooth consumption more eﬀectively. Over time, in the NBC econ-
omy wealth dispersion grows at a faster rate (as some agents keep saving and others keep
borrowing), which translates into faster growth in consumption inequality. In the absence
of binding borrowing limits, cross-sectional consumption inequality should remain constant
during retirement, as consumption growth would be the same for every agent (and equal to
βR). This is essentially the case for the NBC economy, whereas in the ZBC economy the
fraction of agents at the constraint gradually rises during retirement, which slowly reduces
the cross-sectional consumption dispersion.
16Permanent Shock Transitory Shock
Data Model Model Data Model Model











Table 1: Results from the benchmark models with NBC and ZBC
4.2 BPP insurance coeﬃcients in the data and the model
We now turn to the insurance coeﬃcients. To be consistent with the BPP approach, when
computing insurance coeﬃcients, log consumption and log after-tax earnings are deﬁned as
residuals from a common age proﬁle and denoted as (cit,yit).
In all tables and ﬁgures that follow, columns labeled “Data BPP” report the BPP (2008)
empirical estimates (with associated standard errors) from the merged PSID/CEX data set
(1980-1992). Columns labeled “Model BPP” refer to the estimates of the model’s insurance
coeﬃcients calculated using the instrumental variables approach described in Section 2.1, i.e.,
φ
x
BPP. The diﬀerence between Data BPP and Model BPP is informative on the extent of
consumption insurance in the model relative to the data, since these are measured in exactly
the same way. In other words, that diﬀerence tells us how much consumption insurance
there is in the data beyond self-insurance.
Average insurance coeﬃcients Table 1 shows that applying the BPP methodology
to the simulated panel of consumption and income generates insurance coeﬃcients of 0.22
for permanent shocks and 0.94 for transitory shocks in the economy with natural borrowing
limits (NBC). In the economy with zero borrowing (ZBC), these two coeﬃcients are 0.07
and 0.82, respectively. These numbers compare to estimates of insurance coeﬃcients of,
respectively, 0.36 and 0.95 in the US data.
Hence, the model generates the right amount of insurance with respect to transitory
shocks in the NBC economy and 87% of its data counterpart in the ZBC economy. In this
respect, the model is successful. However, the amount of insurance against permanent shocks
is substantially less than in the US economy: around 60% of its empirical value in the NBC
economy and 20% in the ZBC economy. In this respect, the model admits substantially
less insurance than the US economy against permanent earnings shocks. Even though the
17BPP estimates are imprecise, the model coeﬃcient for the ZBC economy is outside a 90%
conﬁdence interval around the point estimate.24
4.3 Accuracy of the BPP methodology
We now assess the accuracy of the BPP methodology for estimating insurance coeﬃcients.
This can be done by comparing the columns labeled “Model BPP” and “Model TRUE.”
This latter label refers to the model’s insurance coeﬃcients φ
x calculated directly from the
realizations of the individual shocks instead of the instruments.
Table 1 reveals that whereas the BPP methodology works extremely well for transitory
shocks, it tends to systematically underestimate the amount of insurance for permanent
shocks. The bias is very small for the NBC economy, just 0.01, but it is large for the
ZBC economy, around 0.16. This result suggests that the unbiased empirical estimate of the
insurance coeﬃcient for permanent shocks φ
η
BPP may be even higher than 0.36, which is the
BPP point estimate for the US economy.25
Failure of orthogonality conditions This downward bias in the BPP estimator
for permanent shocks is exacerbated in the ZBC economy. The reason for the large bias
in φ
η
BPP is that the orthogonality conditions in (SM) may fail when agents are near the
liquidity constraint.26 It turns out that both covariances in (SM) contribute to the negative
bias. However, the quantitatively more important factor is that cov (∆cit,εi,t−2) < 0.
To gain intuition for why this covariance may be negative near the borrowing limit,
consider a household who receives a negative transitory shock at t − 2 (i.e., εt−2 < 0).
Such a household would like to borrow (or dissave) to smooth the negative shock. However,
for a household close to its borrowing limit, even a small reduction in wealth can have a
large expected utility cost because of the possibility of becoming constrained in the future.
This smoothing entails an optimal drop in consumption at t − 2. The closer agents are to
the borrowing constraint, the larger this drop. This leads to a positive expected change in
24A previous draft contained a welfare calculation, based on Heathcote et al. (2008a), which established
that the discrepancy between φ = 0.36 (data) and φ = 0.23 (model) is equivalent, in welfare terms, to around
3% of lifetime consumption.
25Authors’ calculations suggest that the absolute size of biases is largely independent of the level of the
true value. Hence, unbiased point estimates of φ
η
BPP for the US economy, once accounting for the downward
bias, could be anywhere between 0.37 and 0.52 depending how constrained US households are.
26Recall that assumption (SM) is required for identiﬁcation of insurance coeﬃcients for permanent shocks,
but not for transitory shocks.
18consumption in the next period, i.e. cov (∆ct−1,εt−2) < 0 as consumption returns to its
baseline level. Since agents prefer smooth paths for consumption, this adjustment takes
place gradually and cov(∆ct,εt−2) < 0 as well.27
Small-sample bias Even though we have mainly interpreted the data-model discrep-
ancy in the BPP coeﬃcients as a failure of the orthogonality conditions assumed by BPP,
there is an additional source of discrepancy. Although in the model’s simulations we use
a very large sample, the BPP estimates are based on a smaller sample of around 17,000
household/year observations, or roughly 1,300 households per year. To assess the magnitude
of the small-sample bias, we have run 50 simulations of samples with 1,300 households each.
The means of both the true and the BPP coeﬃcients are virtually unchanged, so we conclude
that the small-sample bias is negligible.
4.4 Age proﬁles of insurance coeﬃcients
Transitory shocks Not only are the overall true insurance coeﬃcients for transitory
shocks, φ
ε, diﬀerent in the ZBC and NBC economies (0.82 versus 0.94), but the shape
of their respective life-cycle proﬁles is very diﬀerent. This is evident from Figure 2.
In the NBC economy, the insurance coeﬃcients for transitory shocks are above 0.85 at
all ages and decrease slightly with age. The loose debt limits allow young households to
smooth the eﬀects of negative transitory shocks even though they have not accumulated
much precautionary wealth. The decrease with age is due to the shortening time horizon. A
transitory income shock is eﬀectively transitory only insofar as there are remaining future
dates in which an oﬀsetting shock may be received. This is the horizon eﬀect that we
discussed in Section 2.2 in reference to the PIH. Finally, note that the BPP estimator is
extremely accurate at every age.
When we impose a no-borrowing constraint, the age pattern of the transitory insurance
coeﬃcients changes dramatically: it starts at around 0.40 at age 25 and increases sharply
in a concave fashion to 0.93 by age 45. As explained, young workers have little wealth and
cannot borrow. As such, they are unable to smooth negative transitory shocks until they
27With a longer panel, it may be possible to reduce the downward bias in φ
η
BPP by adding additional lags
of income growth to the instrument. For example, using g
η
t (yi) = ∆yi,t−2+∆yi,t−1+∆yit+∆yi,t+1 changes








= cov (∆cit,εi,t−3) = 0. The
cost of using this modiﬁed instrument is the additional year of income data required and the associated
increase in measurement error.
































Figure 2: Age proﬁles of insurance coeﬃcients for transitory shocks.
have accumulated enough precautionary savings. Once this point is reached, the proﬁle
starts declining as the horizon eﬀect kicks in. In the ZBC case too, the BPP estimator is
consistently accurate.
Permanent shocks The true average value of the insurance coeﬃcient φ
η is virtu-
ally the same in the two economies, 0.23.28 It may seem puzzling that, when borrowing
constraints are tightened, insurance does not worsen. However, when doing this thought
experiment, total wealth is kept constant. Therefore, wealth shifts from old to young house-
holds in the form of higher precautionary saving, which increases insurance coeﬃcients for
the young.
BPP report that when they allow the insurance coeﬃcient for permanent shocks to vary
linearly with age, they estimate a slope that is positive but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.29 Figure 3 reveals a much starker scenario for both economies. In the NBC economy,
φ
η
t are mildly decreasing at young ages, but are increasing steadily after age 35 and are
markedly convex in age. The BPP estimator is always very close to its true value, except
28This insurance coeﬃcient implies a “marginal propensity to consume” out of permanent shocks of roughly
0.77. Based on his buﬀer-stock model of consumption, Carroll (2001) explains that the “conventional intu-
ition” that this marginal propensity should be one (as in the strict version of the PIH) is ﬂawed in a life-cycle
model.
29BPP also estimate a larger insurance coeﬃcient for the cohorts born in the 1930s compared to those
born in the 1940s but, once again, the diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁcant.




































Figure 3: Age proﬁles of insurance coeﬃcients for permanent shocks.
at young ages, where agents have the largest debt and are close to their natural limit. The
overall shape of the proﬁle in the ZBC economy is similar, except for the initial decrease.
As one could have anticipated, the BPP methodology severely underestimates φ
η
t at young
ages, because a large fraction of households is at the constraint. The bias gradually reaches
zero only around age 45.
The general shape of the true insurance coeﬃcient is driven by two forces. First, there is
the wealth composition eﬀect. As agents accumulate ﬁnancial wealth, for precautionary and
life-cycle reasons, they consume more out of ﬁnancial wealth and less out of human wealth
(i.e., the expected discounted value of their earnings), so permanent shocks to earnings have
a smaller impact on consumption. As a result, insurance coeﬃcients have a strong tendency
to rise with age. This also explains why in the NBC economy insurance coeﬃcients decline
in the early part of the life cycle. The deterministically increasing age proﬁle for earnings
provides a strong incentive to borrow early in life to smooth consumption, and, as explained,
insurance coeﬃcients for permanent shocks are increasing in net ﬁnancial wealth.30
30We have uncovered that the true insurance coeﬃcient φ
η
t may go slightly negative over the ﬁrst decade.
A negative value for φ
η
t is obtained when cov (∆cit,ηit) > var(ηit), i.e. consumption responds more than
one-for-one to a particular shock. The reason this may happen is due to the interaction of transitory shocks
and permanent shocks in the model, as explained by Carroll (1997). With σε > 0, households will accumulate
a target level of wealth which they use to buﬀer the eﬀects of transitory shocks. When a positive permanent
shock hits, transitory shocks become a smaller component of lifetime income, both in the current period and
in all future periods. Hence, the utility cost of not being able to smooth transitory shocks falls. Households






Model TRUE Model BPP Model TRUE Model BPP β
Benchmark 0.23 0.22 0.94 0.94 0.971
Initial Wealth Distrib. 0.23 0.22 0.94 0.94 0.971
Risk Aversion:
γ = 1 0.22 0.21 0.94 0.94 0.973
γ = 5 0.27 0.24 0.93 0.93 0.945
γ = 10 0.32 0.29 0.92 0.92 0.855
γ = 15 0.37 0.32 0.92 0.92 0.740
Social Security:
Rep. ratio = 0.25 0.19 0.17 0.93 0.93 0.958
Rep. ratio = 0.65 0.27 0.26 0.94 0.94 0.982
Variance Perm. Shock:
ση = 0.02 0.25 0.24 0.93 0.93 0.963
ση = 0.005 0.22 0.20 0.94 0.94 0.975
ση age speciﬁc 0.24 0.24 0.94 0.94 0.971
Variance Initial Perm.:
σz0 = 0.2 0.23 0.22 0.94 0.94 0.971
σz0 = 0.1 0.24 0.22 0.94 0.94 0.972
Variance Trans. Shock
σε = 0.075 0.24 0.22 0.94 0.94 0.971
σε = 0.025 0.23 0.22 0.94 0.94 0.971
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis for the model with NBC
Second, there is the time horizon eﬀect. By deﬁnition, permanent shocks rescale the entire
earnings proﬁle during the work life, and also have an eﬀect on retirement income, whose size
is inversely proportional to the progressivity of the pension system. As households get closer
to retirement, less of their human wealth is aﬀected in this way by permanent shocks.31
reduce the optimal level of wealth they desire to buﬀer transitory shocks. Consumption may thus respond
to the full eﬀect of the positive permanent shock, plus an additional amount that is the decrease in the
optimal precautionary wealth level. A similar logic applies to negative permanent shocks. We have veriﬁed
that when we simulate the model without transitory shocks (σε = 0), then φ
η
t is always positive.
31Interestingly, the true insurance coeﬃcients for both permanent and transitory shock at retirement are
equal (see Figures 2 and 3). In the absence of any pension system (or in presence of the most redistributive
system, where beneﬁts are a lump sum disconnected from lifetime earnings), both insurance coeﬃcients at
retirement should be approximately one. Since in the model, social security beneﬁts depend also on income
in the last year of work, we ﬁnd that they are both slightly less than one.






Model TRUE Model BPP Model TRUE Model BPP β
Benchmark 0.23 0.07 0.82 0.82 0.964
Initial Wealth Distrib. 0.24 0.09 0.83 0.83 0.963
Risk Aversion:
γ = 1 0.23 0.05 0.81 0.81 0.969
γ = 5 0.23 0.12 0.85 0.85 0.933
γ = 10 0.29 0.19 0.88 0.88 0.838
γ = 15 0.33 0.23 0.88 0.88 0.712
Social Security:
Rep. ratio = 0.25 0.21 −0.00 0.78 0.78 0.947
Rep. ratio = 0.65 0.25 0.13 0.86 0.85 0.977
Variance Perm. Shock:
ση = 0.02 0.23 0.15 0.83 0.83 0.957
ση = 0.005 0.23 −0.09 0.82 0.82 0.968
ση age speciﬁc 0.24 0.08 0.82 0.82 0.964
Variance Initial Perm.:
σz0 = 0.2 0.23 0.07 0.82 0.82 0.964
σz0 = 0.1 0.24 0.08 0.83 0.83 0.965
Variance Trans. Shock
σε = 0.075 0.24 0.00 0.83 0.83 0.963
σε = 0.025 0.23 0.14 0.82 0.82 0.966
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis for the model with ZBC
4.5 Sensitivity analysis
Tables 2 and 3 report a wide set of sensitivity analysis on the baseline economy with NBC
and ZBC, respectively. In each of these experiments, we recalibrate the economy (i.e., we
reset β) in order to maintain a wealth-income ratio of 2.5. The corresponding value of β is
reported in each row.
The right-hand side of the tables shows that our computed insurance coeﬃcient against
transitory shocks is extremely robust across diﬀerent parameterizations. The left-hand
side of the tables reports results for the permanent shock. Allowing for an initial wealth
distribution—calibrated on the asset holdings of the young in the SCF—has very little eﬀect
on the insurance coeﬃcients. Households with high levels of risk aversion are less tolerant
of consumption ﬂuctuation; thus, as γ rises the insurance coeﬃcients for permanent shocks
also increase. However, only for values of γ beyond 15, do we reach insurance coeﬃcients
23close to those estimated in the data. When we reduce the average replacement ratio of the
social security system from 0.45 to 0.25, insurance coeﬃcients drop, and when we increase
it to 0.65 they increase, as expected.
Interestingly, the amount of insurance in the model does not depend on the size of the
shocks when the latter is varied within a plausible range. We also allowed the variance
of permanent shocks to be age-speciﬁc (we kept its average equal to 0.01), and results are
unaltered, i.e., the average insurance coeﬃcient and its age proﬁle are virtually unchanged.32
The reason, as we explain in Section 6.1, is that φ
η is a “relative metric,” i.e. it is largely
independent of the variance of the shock ση since it is normalized by this variance.
In the NBC economy, the bias in the BPP estimator is always of the same order of mag-
nitude and rather small, except for the high γ case. In the ZBC economy, the bias is always
large and particularly so in some cases. For example, with large transitory uncertainty, the
borrowing limit will bind more often. With a small replacement rate, ﬁnancial wealth shifts
from young workers who are subject to income shocks to retirees who are not.
Interest rate and K/Y ratio Figure 4 plots the values of φ
η as a function of var-
ious wealth-income ratios (obtained by changing β) and of various values of r in the two
economies. Higher wealth-income ratios map into larger asset holdings that can be used to
smooth income shocks, and hence into higher values for φ
η. The idea that patient consumers
can self-insure eﬀectively goes back to Yaari (1976) in partial equilibrium and Carroll (1997)
and Levine & Zame (2002) in general equilibrium.33 Lower interest rates increase insurance
coeﬃcients in the NBC economy, as they loosen the borrowing limit, and the eﬀect is there-
fore stronger in an economy with low aggregate wealth. In the ZBC economy, lower interest
rates reduce the cost of precautionary saving. Qualitatively, consumption smoothing goes
up, but we ﬁnd that quantitatively the eﬀects are negligible.
32Speciﬁcally, we used the PSID data set from Heathcote, Perri & Violante (2009) to construct a sample
of households with the same broad features of the sample selected by BPP for the period 1978-1992. More
importantly, we deﬁned income as disposable household income minus ﬁnancial income, and we dropped
records with income growth above 500% and below -80%. We estimated the variance of permanent shocks
at age a as
σa
η = var(∆yia) + cov (∆yia,∆yi,a−1) + cov (∆yi,a+1,∆yi,a),
and we smoothed the resulting estimates of σa
η with a cubic polynomial in age. The smooth permanent
variances are markedly U shaped, and the lowest value (around age 45) is roughly half of the highest values,
at ages 25 and 60.
33As expected, we also ﬁnd that the bias in the BPP coeﬃcient grows as the wealth-income ratios are
reduced.
































































































Figure 4: Sensitivity of φη with respect to r and K/Y in the NBC and ZBC economies.
5 Advance information
In this section, we assess whether allowing the agents to know more about their future income
growth than the “econometrician” can reconcile the gap between the insurance coeﬃcients
estimated by BPP with those computed in the benchmark models.34 If part of a measured
income change at date t was known to the agents in advance, then this change would already
be incorporated into consumption decisions at the time it was learned and would not aﬀect
consumption growth at t. The contemporaneous correlation of measured income growth with
consumption growth at date t would be lower than if all of the income growth was “news”
at t.
Taking a stand on the particular form that the advance information takes is necessary. We
examine two cases that make diﬀerent assumptions on the timing of receipt of information.
In the ﬁrst model, agents learn about a component of their permanent shock to income one
period in advance. An interpretation is that of receiving a signal about a future pay raise,
wage cut, promotion, or demotion, in the period before the change actually takes place. In
the second model, we allow agents to foresee the entire slope of their own income proﬁle upon
entry in the labor market, i.e., at age t = 0. This model is a version of the heterogeneous
34The interest in the role of “advance information” has been revived in a series of recent papers by Cunha
et al. (2005), Huggett et al. (2006), Primiceri & van Rens (2006), and Guvenen (2007), among others.
25income proﬁles model studied by Lillard & Weiss (1979), Baker (1997), Haider (2001), and
Guvenen (2007), among others. An interpretation is that, by choosing a speciﬁc occupation,
an individual knows what income proﬁle to expect. These two cases capture two extreme
views of foreknowledge of income changes. In the former, it is short-term advance news on
income shocks; in the latter it is long-term anticipation of income paths.
We are also interested in knowing what the BPP estimator captures in these two cases.
BPP are aware that, in the presence of advanced information, their identiﬁcation strategy
may fail and state that, in such case, “the estimated coeﬃcient has to be interpreted as
reﬂecting a combination of insurance and information” (BPP, p. 1899). We will show that
although this is exactly true in the second model, in the ﬁrst model only the insurance
component is reﬂected in the value of φ
η
BPP. Put diﬀerently, “long-run” foreknowledge
seriously compromises identiﬁability of insurance coeﬃcients of permanent shocks, whereas
the “short-run” type makes little diﬀerence.
5.1 Short-run anticipation of permanent shocks
Consider a modiﬁcation of the information set of the agent whereby the permanent change




it is the true shock that becomes known to the agent only at date t and aﬀects
income at date t. The component ηa
it is already in the agent’s information set at date t − 1,
but it is only incorporated into income at date t. The permanent component of earnings is
given by







it) = 0, and the variances of the two components are varied in a way
that keeps var (ηit) = var(ηs
it + ηa
it) constant at its baseline value of 0.01.
Permanent shocks In the economy with NBC, from the deﬁnition of the insurance
coeﬃcient for permanent shocks,
φ






















are “insurance coeﬃcients” with respect to the two components of per-
manent earnings growth (the shock and the change known in advance), and α is the share of
26the variance of permanent earnings growth that is known one period ahead (i.e., the advance
information ratio). The approximate equality in the last line holds because, when borrowing
constraints are unimportant, as for the NBC economy, cov(∆cit,ηa
it) ≈ 0, since ηa
it is fully
incorporated in consumption growth at t − 1. It follows that the true insurance coeﬃcient
φ




and advance information, whose relative magnitude
is regulated by α.
However, when the BPP methodology is used to estimate insurance coeﬃcients for per-
manent shocks, we reach a diﬀerent conclusion. In what follows, it is useful to ignore the
(small in the NBC economy) downward bias discussed in Section 4.3 due to the failure of
assumption (SM) and associated to the covariance between ∆cit and shocks εi,t−2 and ηs
i,t−1.





BPP = 1 −
cov(∆cit,∆yi,t−1 + ∆yit + ∆yi,t+1)























































The ﬁrst line uses the fact that cov(∆cit,ηa
it) ≈ 0. As evident from the third line, the




and a term that looks like an insurance coeﬃcient for the component of the t + 1 earnings
growth that is known at t. This last term enters the expression through the component
∆yi,t+1 of the BPP instrument, i.e., assumption (NF) fails to hold. Since, in the NBC
economy, consumption growth ∆cit should react equally to ηs
it and to ηa
i,t+1 (except for a




, as stated in the last line.35
We conclude that, whereas the true insurance coeﬃcient φ
η reﬂects a combination of
insurance and advance information as seen in (11), the BPP coeﬃcient φ
η
BPP is roughly
independent of the amount of foresight. As a result, this form of advance information
cannot account for the data-model discrepancy.
35Kaufmann & Pistaferri (2009) contains a similar derivation of the BPP insurance coeﬃcient in the
presence of advance information of this type. However, they assume that all news about ηt+1 accrues before
date t. Because of this assumption, they conclude that φ
η






, as is clear from the
next-to-last row in 11, and they are led to think that advance information induces an attenuation bias in
the BPP estimator.
27Transitory shocks For transitory shocks, we have exactly the opposite result. The
true insurance coeﬃcients φ
ε are unaﬀected by the presence of advanced information be-
cause the response of consumption growth to transitory shocks is invariant to the timing of
news about permanent shocks. However, the BPP estimator φ
ε
BPP has an upward bias that
increases with the size of α. To understand this bias, note that
φ
ε



























it). The upward bias
results from a failure of the identiﬁcation assumption (NF), since a fraction of next period
permanent income growth in ∆yi,t+1 is known in advance and transmits to consumption
growth at date t. Quantitatively, this upward bias is small. Since the variance of the
permanent innovation is 1/5 of that of transitory shocks, with α = 1/3 the bias would be
around 0.05.36
5.2 Long-run foreknowledge of income paths
Consider a generalization of the income process in (5) that includes heterogeneous slopes in
individual income proﬁles:
yit = βit + zit + εit
zit = zi,t−1 + ηit,
with E(βi) = 0 in the cross section, and var(βi) = σβ.37 We assume that βi is in the
information set of the agents at age zero. In the experiments that follow, we keep σε as
in the benchmark calibration, gradually change the value for σβ, and set ση residually so
that the overall rise in the cross-sectional variance of log earnings from age 25 to age 60 is
unchanged.
36Simulations conﬁrm these results and show that in the ZBC economy, the usual severe downward bias
is always at work, but qualitatively the ﬁndings are the same.
37We retain the unit root speciﬁcation for the permanent component of the income process, notwithstand-
ing the empirical evidence for substantially lower persistence when heterogeneous slopes are present. We
do this to provide a clean analysis of the eﬀects of heterogeneous slopes without confounding the eﬀects of
lower persistence. We separately analyze the issue of persistence in Section 6.
28Permanent Shock Transitory Shock
Data 0.36 (0.09) 0.95 (0.04)
Model Model Model Model
TRUE BPP TRUE BPP β
Natural BC
40% 0.23 0.25 0.94 0.94 0.975
60% 0.23 0.28 0.94 0.94 0.978
80% 0.22 0.37 0.94 0.94 0.980
Zero BC
40% 0.23 −0.01 0.82 0.82 0.966
60% 0.23 −0.10 0.82 0.82 0.968
80% 0.23 −0.31 0.82 0.82 0.969
Table 4: Results for the model with heterogeneous income slopes
The results of this experiment for the two economies are reported in Table 4. To get a
sense of the size of advance information in each experiment, in the ﬁrst column of Table 4
we report the fraction of the variance in log earnings at age 60 that is already known by the
agents upon entering the labor market.38
The true insurance coeﬃcients for permanent and transitory shocks (φ
η,φ
ε) are un-
changed from the benchmark model. The reason is that the full eﬀect of knowledge about
βi is incorporated into the level consumption from the outset, but insurance coeﬃcients are
a measure of how much consumption growth responds to contemporaneous shocks. This
response is not aﬀected by the presence of heterogeneous slopes known at t = 0.
We now turn to the implications for the BPP coeﬃcients. Table 4 shows that the down-
ward bias in the BPP estimator decreases (and eventually becomes positive) as the amount
of advance information is increased. The source of this additional upward bias is as follows.
Ignoring the usual sources of downward bias due to the failure of assumption (SM), the
BPP insurance coeﬃcient is given by
φ
η
BPP = 1 −
cov(∆cit,∆yi,t−1 + ∆yit + ∆yi,t+1)












≈ (1 − α)φ
η + αφ
β,




29where α = 3var(βi)/[var(ηit) + 3var(βi)] is another version of the advance information
ratio.
In the NBC model, the term φ
β is close to one, since ∆cit should be roughly invariant to
βi at any t. This is a source of upward bias in the BPP estimator, and the bias is larger the
larger is α. However, Table 4 shows that only in the case where 80% of the variance of income
at age 60 is known already at age 25, arguably an upper bound for advance information, is
the BPP coeﬃcient in the model at the level of its empirical counterpart.39
In the ZBC economy, φ
β is close to zero. This induces a further source of downward bias,
which worsens as one increases the amount of advance information in the economy. As σβ
grows, the economy is populated by a larger fraction of agents with steep income proﬁles who
would like to borrow against their future income but are liquidity constrained. As already
explained, the larger the fraction of constrained agents, the stronger the downward bias.
6 Persistent income shocks
Following BPP, we have focused on a particular income process that restricts shocks to be
either fully permanent or fully transitory. There is no scope for income shocks that have
lasting but not permanent eﬀects on income. In this section, we relax this assumption. One
plausible explanation for why we ﬁnd higher insurance coeﬃcients in the data than in the
model is that, in reality, shocks are not purely permanent. Persistent shocks are easier to
smooth by precautionary saving and borrowing.
Consider a variant of the income process whereby zt follows an AR(1) process with
parameter ρ < 1:
zit = ρzit−1 + ηit. (15)
In the terminology of the more general model in equation (1), we now have a0 = (1,1) and
aj = (ρj,0)
′, j ≥ 0.
Identiﬁcation With this income process, the identiﬁcation strategy of Section 2.1
is no longer valid. We propose two new gx
t (y) functions that identify the two insurance
coeﬃcients for x = {η,ε}. In order to do this, we assume that an external estimate of ρ is
available.40
39In the NBC model, as the fraction of information known in advance approaches 100%, the BPP estimator
should approach 1.0. Simulations conﬁrm this prediction.
40This is a reasonable assumption, since ρ can be identiﬁed using panel data on income alone, and thus






Model Model Model Model Model Model
TRUE BPP BPP TRUE BPP BPP
Misspeciﬁed Misspeciﬁed β
Natural BC:
ρ = 0.99 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.966
ρ = 0.98 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.963
ρ = 0.97 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.960
ρ = 0.95 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.955
ρ = 0.93 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.92 0.93 0.88 0.953
Zero BC:
ρ = 0.99 0.27 0.17 0.16 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.960
ρ = 0.98 0.30 0.24 0.22 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.955
ρ = 0.97 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.951
ρ = 0.95 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.945
ρ = 0.93 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.81 0.82 0.78 0.940
Table 5: Results from the models with persistent earnings shocks
Deﬁne the quasi-diﬀerence of log income as ˜ ∆yt ≡ yt − ρyt−1. Identiﬁcation of the two
insurance coeﬃcients can be achieved by setting gε
t (y) = ˜ ∆yt+1 and g
η
t (y) = ρ2˜ ∆yt−1 +
ρ˜ ∆yt + ˜ ∆yt+1. For the transitory shock, we have
cov
￿


















2 ˜ ∆yi,t−1 + ρ˜ ∆yit + ˜ ∆yi,t+1
￿
= ρcov(∆cit,ηit).
Thus, in both cases, expression (4) yields a consistent estimator of φ
x, under exactly the
same pair of assumptions (NF) and (SM).
Results In Table 5 we present insurance coeﬃcients from the NBC and the ZBC
models, where zit follows the process in (15). As we decrease ρ, we increase ση in order
can be estimated in a separate ﬁrst stage, before the estimation of insurance coeﬃcients. Obviously, with
short panels, distinguishing between a unit root and a stationary but very persistent AR(1) is challenging.
31to keep the rise in the variance of log earnings over the life cycle unchanged and equal to
the data counterpart. The column headed “Model TRUE” reports insurance coeﬃcients
calculated using the realized values of the shocks. The column headed “Model BPP” reports
estimates using the estimation procedure just described. Finally, the column headed “Model
BPP Misspeciﬁed” reports the estimates that would obtain if one were to use the (invalid)
instruments from the model with permanent shocks. This last column is the correct model
counterpart of the BPP estimates.
The coeﬃcients obtained with the misspeciﬁed BPP instruments are very close to those
obtained with the correct instruments, at all levels of ρ. This is true for the models both
with and without tight borrowing constraint, so the bias that results from applying the
instruments from the permanent shock case on data generated by an AR(1) process, is not
at all severe. It is thus justiﬁed to take the empirical BPP estimate of 0.36 seriously, even
in the case where it was estimated under a misspeciﬁed income process.
Of course, it is still true that the BPP methodology underestimates true insurance coeﬃ-
cients, but the bias is not increased by the income process misspeciﬁcation. On the contrary,
in the ZBC economy, as ρ decreases, the downward bias in the BPP estimator vanishes.
With shocks that are less durable than the unit root, precautionary savings are more useful.
Agents start accumulating wealth right away and move far from the debt constraint early in
life, which explains why the bias is now very small.
The insurance coeﬃcients for persistent shocks quickly increase as ρ declines. In the NBC
economy, with an autoregressive parameter as high as 0.97, the amount of insurance against
persistent shocks in the model is roughly consistent with that in the data. In the ZBC
economy, not surprisingly, one needs to lower ρ somewhat further, to 0.93. These ﬁndings
imply that a model economy with a highly persistent (but not permanent) income process
can generate, on average, the right level of insurance against persistent shocks.
Turning to insurance coeﬃcients for the transitory shocks, here the model with persistent
shocks is slightly less successful. The reason for why the model generates less smoothing with
respect to transitory shocks is that now agents shift the use of savings from the smoothing
of transitory shocks to the smoothing of persistent shocks, and are willing to tolerate larger
ﬂuctuations in consumption due to transitory shocks.
Figure 5 plots the age proﬁles of insurance coeﬃcients for persistent shocks in the two
economies. Relative to the model with permanent shocks, the age proﬁle of insurance co-








































Figure 5: Age proﬁles of insurance coeﬃcients in the NBC and ZBC economies.
eﬃcients is now less steep (and thus more consistent with the data). This is because the
diﬀerence between a permanent and a highly persistent shock is more pertinent for a young
household with many periods ahead.
Age-wealth proﬁles Even though the model with ρ < 1 is, on average, successful in
replicating the BPP estimates, the age proﬁle is too steep relative to the data. The model
has too little insurance for young agents and too much for old agents. Figure 6 provides an
explanation for this result. In the data, the distribution of wealth is much less concentrated
at retirement than in the model.
In this paper, we have chosen to focus on the baseline life-cycle model with standard
preferences and income risk alone, and make a ﬁrst step toward understanding the data-
model gap. Extensions of the SIM model that incorporate saving motives for young (e.g.,
down payment constraints) and for older households (e.g., bequest) would shift wealth in
the right way and help the model to reproduce ﬂatter age-insurance proﬁles. Additional
precautionary saving associated to medical expenditures shocks and survival risk would also
work, qualitatively, in the right direction (Hubbard et al. 1995).41 Similarly, allowing for
a consumption ﬂoor in the budget constraint —a simple way to capture some US social
41A key diﬃculty is that the BPP measures of consumption include out-of-pocket medical expenses, which
are usually modeled as part of the budget constraint but not in preferences.
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Figure 6: Life-cycle proﬁle of wealth in the data and in the model.
insurance program—would mechanically increase consumption smoothing for the poor. The
presence of internal habits should also increase the fraction of precautionary saving and shift
wealth toward young and low-income households (Diaz et al. 2003).
6.1 Comparison with Storesletten-Telmer-Yaron
Following the inﬂuential papers by Deaton & Paxson (1994) and Storesletten et al. (2004),
many authors associate the growth of consumption dispersion over the life cycle to the extent
of risk sharing present in an economy. How does this index of risk sharing compare to our
insurance coeﬃcients against permanent shocks?
In terms of measurement, one may argue that the former is more direct and less depen-
dent on assumptions than the BPP methodology. However, measuring the life-cycle rise in
consumption inequality is also fraught with diﬃculties. Choosing how to model time and
cohort eﬀects, or how to equivalize household consumption, or which items to include in the
deﬁnition of consumption expenditures (Aguiar & Hurst 2008) can make a large diﬀerence.
For example, more recent estimates (Heathcote et al. 2005, Heathcote, Perri & Violante
2009) set the gradient of the consumption inequality over the life cycle to a third of the
original Deaton-Paxson estimate. As a result, what target one should use is not yet clear.
By using year-by-year individual-level consumption and income growth, one does not face
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Figure 7: A comparison between consumption inequality and insurance coeﬃcients
any of these problems.
With respect to the information contained in these two measures, Figure 7 shows, some-
what surprisingly, that they do not always agree. The left panel plots 1 − φ
η, whereas the
right panel plots the alternative measure of (the lack of) insurance, the rise in the variance
of log consumption from age 25 to 60. As ρ declines from 1.00 to 0.90, the insurance co-
eﬃcients φ
η grow monotonically, but the increase in the variance of log consumption has
a nonmonotonic shape.42 First it grows, then it falls. Hence, for values of ρ close to one,
these two criteria disagree on whether lower persistence of the shock increases or decreases
consumption smoothing in the model.
To understand the discrepancy, recall that in the experiment calibration requires that ση
rises as ρ falls. The decline in ρ induces both measures to signal more insurance, but the
rise in ση has a diﬀerent impact. The insurance coeﬃcient is a “relative measure,” i.e., it is
largely independent of the variance of the shock ση, since it is normalized by this variance (see
Tables 2 and 3). However, the growth in consumption dispersion is an “absolute measure”
and, as such, it is directly aﬀected by the size of ση. Storesletten et al. (2004, Figure 6)
42Consistently with the earlier experiment, when we decrease ρ, we increase ση in order to keep the rise
in the variance of log earnings unchanged.
35explain that the rise in consumption inequality may be larger with lower ρ (and higher ση)
because earnings inequality grows faster early in the life cycle, when households have small
wealth holdings and household consumption is most vulnerable to shocks.
7 Conclusions
This paper is inspired by the important empirical ﬁndings by Blundell, Pistaferri & Preston
(2008, BPP). BPP estimate that, in the US economy, 36% of the variance of permanent
income shocks and 95% of the variance of transitory shocks to after-tax household earnings is
insured away by households, i.e., do not translate into contemporaneous consumption growth.
These two numbers, we argue, should become central in quantitative macroeconomics. They
represent a yardstick to measure whether current incomplete-markets macroeconomic models
used for quantitative analysis admit the right amount of household insurance.
In this paper, we make a step forward in this direction by addressing two questions.
First, is the standard incomplete-markets (SIM) model—arguably the workhorse of hetero-
geneous agents macroeconomics—able to replicate such ﬁndings? In this respect, our paper
is an investigation into one of the central properties of these models. Second, does the BPP
methodology provide an unbiased estimator of true insurance coeﬃcients, under the hypoth-
esis that the US economy is accurately described by a SIM model? In this respect, the
paper is an investigation into the reliability of the most up-to-date and exhaustive empirical
measure of consumption insurance for US households.
We have found that when the log-income process is the sum of a permanent and a
transitory component, as assumed by BPP, then a plausibly calibrated environment where
households self-insure by trading a risk-free bond displays less consumption insurance than
the data against permanent shocks, and about the same as the data against transitory shocks.
The model’s shortcoming is particularly stark in environments when borrowing limits are
tight. We have shown that this conclusion is robust across a series of sensitivity analysis,
including allowing for advance information. We have also shown that allowing for a mean-
reverting shock with autocorrelation around 0.95, instead of the permanent component, goes
a long way toward reconciling model and data.
We have also assessed the accuracy of the estimation method proposed by BPP by gen-
eralizing their approach and clarifying that its validity depends on two key orthogonality
36conditions: “no foresight”, and “short memory” of the consumption growth allocation. Es-
timates of insurance coeﬃcients are, in general, downward biased, with the bias exacerbated
whenever households are close to their borrowing constraint. Put diﬀerently, the actual in-
surability of shocks in the US economy may be higher than what was measured by BPP,
especially for young and poor households. Moreover, we also showed that in an economy
with loose borrowing limits where the income process contains an individual-speciﬁc slope
known to the agent (a case of “long-run foreknowledge”), there is a strong source of upward
bias in the BPP estimator which stems from the violation of the no advance information as-
sumption. Perhaps surprisingly, if the income process is misspeciﬁed—as a unit root instead
of a very persistent AR(1)—the BPP identiﬁcation method works very well.
Our investigation suggests several important avenues for future research.
Extending the empirical and theoretical analysis to diﬀerent income deﬁnitions (e.g.,
hourly wages, individual earnings, pre-government household earnings) would shed light
on the relative importance of the various insurance mechanisms to which households have
access, beyond self-insurance through borrowing/saving (e.g., individual labor supply, intra-
household insurance, government redistribution, interpersonal transfers).43
The question that motivates our paper—whether the standard incomplete-markets model
built around “self-insurance” features the right amount of consumption smoothing—could be
approached diﬀerently. For example, one could rely on the large literature on the consumers’
response to tax rebates (Souleles 1999, Shapiro & Slemrod 2003) to replicate in detail one
of the latest refunds (2001 or 2008) and compare the model’s prediction to the econometric
and survey-based estimates.
The misalignment between the age proﬁle of insurance coeﬃcients in the model and the
data is particularly acute for young individuals. This suggests that modiﬁcations of the
model that ﬂatten its age-wealth proﬁle, bringing it closer to the data, would also improve
its performance in this dimension. Alternatively, future research should try to identify
additional sources of insurance against permanent shocks for the young, over and above
borrowing and saving. Kaplan (2008), who explores the role of co-residence decisions for
unskilled youths, is a promising example.
Finally, future research should explore whether endogenously incomplete-markets models
43Heathcote, Perri & Violante (2009) document the time-series of cross-sectional US inequality in all these
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of income, and in consumption, since the late 1960s.
37(e.g., environments with limited enforcement or private information) can replicate the two
key BPP empirical estimates of the degree of household insurance against permanent and
transitory shocks. Krueger & Perri (2005), Attanasio & Pavoni (2007),Krueger & Perri
(2008), and Broer (2009) already made progress in this direction.
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